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Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
I. INTRODUCTION
The corporate scandals of recent years have brought the accountability
of corporate officers, and other related actors into the limelight. Civil litiga-
tion, particularly securities litigation, is one of the mechanisms helping to
keep corporate actors in check. Investors who have purchased securities at a
time when a corporation seemed to be financially successful have lost sub-
stantial amounts of money when the corporation's success turns out to be a
mere sham and the investments have lost their value. While the necessity of
holding corporations themselves liable for committing securities fraud is
hardly questioned, such actions are often not successful - those corporations
may be bankrupt, and securities action against them is often fruitless. Thus,
plaintiffs often turn against actors who participated in various ways in the
securities fraud of the company. Such actors include corporate officers, law
firms, accountants/auditors, investment banks, as well as business partners.
The main vehicle for such actions is section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19341 and the corresponding Securities and Exchange Com-
2mission Rule lOb-5. However, this path has not been easy since the Su-
preme Court held in 1994 that there is no private right of action against par-
ties aiding and abetting securities law violations under section 10(b).3 In the
last few years, plaintiffs have tried to avoid this limitation by using a theory
called "scheme liability, ' 4 a "quite cutting edge" theory as one district court
recently put it.5 In relatively few years, the scope of scheme liability may
well have become "the single most important issue being litigated in securi-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-nn (2000).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
3. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994).
4. On the nature of "scheme liability," see infra Part II.B. "Scheme liability"
has become the term of the art. See, e.g., Quaak v. Dexia, S.A., 445 F. Supp. 2d 130,
134 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that the law regarding "scheme liability" was not settled
at previous stages of the case).
5. Quaak, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 134. See also United States v. Finnerty, Nos. 05
Cr.393 DC, 05 Cr. 397 DC, 2006 WL 2802042, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006) ("[T]he
law with respect to subsections (a) and (c) is not very refined.").
1
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ties class actions today." 6 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari in order to bring some clarity into law. 7
This law summary analyzes the recent cases where plaintiffs have tried
to utilize the scheme liability theory. 8 Even though courts have frequently
analyzed claims based on this theory, they approach the issue rather uns-
ystematically, reach inconsistent results, and do not employ a similar analytic
structure. 9 Part of this inconsistency is based on the fact that scheme liability
is applied in cases involving very different fraudulent practices and against
actors with very different functions. Due to this wide range of circumstances,
the different approaches of courts may actually be justified. It is probably
inappropriate to formulate a single test or rule for deciding scheme liability
cases. Instead, courts should approach each case separately, based on the
type of defendant and the type of claim.
6. Brooke Masters & Patti Waldmeir, Courts to Rule on Liability for Fraud
Losses, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2007, at 10 (quoting Bob Giuffra, an attorney with law
firm Sullivan & Cromwell).
7. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (In re Charter
Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 443 F.3d 987 (2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3034
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-43).
8. Very few articles in scholarly and professional journals have so far devoted
significant attention to this topic, usually providing a descriptive account of a few
recent cases. The most extensive treatments are Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Note,
Scheme Liability: Rule lOb-5(a) and Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26
REv. LITIG. 183 (2007); Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liability Under Rules lOb-5(a) & (c),
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 631 (2006); Gregory A. Markel & Gregory G. Ballard, The Evolu-
tion of "Scheme" Liability Under Section 10(b), 1571 PLI/CoRP 991 (2006); and
Matthew L. Mustokoff, "Scheme" Liability Under Rule 1Ob-5: The New Battleground
in Securities Fraud Litigation, FED. LAW., June 2006, at 20. Even those articles,
however, focus on few recent cases only, mostly from the appeals courts. See also
Jeffrey Q. Smith & James K. Goldfarb, An Emerging Standard for Secondary Actor
Liability Under the Federal Securities Law, ANDREws SEC. LTIG. & REG. REP., Oct.
4, 2006, at 2; Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Secondary Actor Liability Un-
der Rule lob-5, N.Y. L. J. at 3 (June 13, 2006) (comparing two cases); Tracy A.
Nichols & Stephen P. Warren, Gatekeepers Under Fire from Securities Plaintiffs and
Regulators: When Doing Your Job Can Amount to "Scheme Liability" Under Rule
lOb-5(a) and (c) or Constitute Aiding and Abetting According to the SEC, 1562
PLI/CoRP 611 (2006) (discussing two cases).
9. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig.), No. H-01-3624, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *173 (S.D. Tex.
June 5, 2006) ("It is obvious that courts are divided over the scheme liability issue.");
Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 999 ("[T]he state of the law as reflected in circuit
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SCHEME LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B)
1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in order to, among other goals, "insure the maintenance of fair and hon-
est markets."' 10 One of the most important provisions of the Act is section
10(b), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered..., any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."
Under section 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission promul-
gated more detailed rules outlining the duties of participants in securities
transactions. According to Rule 1 Ob-5, it is prohibited, in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, to employ a "device, scheme or artifice to de-
fraud;"' 12 to make "any untrue statement of a material fact" or to fail to "state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not mis-
leading;"' 13 and to engage in "any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."'
14
In 1994, the Supreme Court limited litigation possibilities under section
10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A. 15 In that case, a public building authority had twice (in 1986
and in 1988) issued bonds for public improvements in a commercial and resi-
dential development. 16 According to the bond covenants, the bonds were
secured by land, which had to be worth at least 160% of the bonds' out-
standing principal and interest. 17 The land securing the 1986 issue was prop-
erly valued. 18 Before the 1988 issue, real estate values had plummeted and
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(a) (2006).
13. Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
14. Id. § 240.10b-5(c).
15. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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thus old land appraisals became significantly inflated. 19 Central Bank, the
bond indenture trustee, 20 allegedly knew that the land appraisals were incor-
rect but delayed an updated and independent review of the land values.
21
After the building authority defaulted on the bonds, investors sued not only
the building authority and some other defendants, but also Central Bank.22
The Supreme Court held that the bank was engaged at most in aiding
and abetting the building authority, but that there is no private right of action
against parties aiding and abetting securities law violations. 23 This case was
especially comforting for entities such as investment banks, attorneys, audi-
tors and others who consult or otherwise provide help to companies offering
public securities. Other entities that directly benefited from the Supreme
Court decision were the contractual partners of the securities law violators,
whose transactions with the primary actors could be used for securities fraud,
usually through misleading reporting by the securities' issuer.
However, the Supreme Court did not absolve the secondary actors of all
liability. In Central Bank, the court itself warned that "any person or entity
... who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a
primary violator under Rule 1Ob-5." 24 Encouraged by this statement, plain-
tiffs have been creative in finding ways to characterize the behavior of secon-
dary actors as not amounting to merely aiding and abetting, but as active in-
volvement as a primary participant in the securities fraud.
A. Liability Based on Misrepresentation Under Rule 1Ob-5(b)
In the wake of Central Bank, the main avenue for imposing liability on
parties such as accountants, lawyers, underwriters, and investment banks
("secondary actors") 25 was by applying Rule 1Ob-5(b), which prohibited the
19. Id.
20. Bond indenture trustee is an impartial entity charged with carrying out the
terms of the bond, and resolve conflicts between the bond issuer and bondholders who
may have adverse interests. See Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Inter-
state Bank: Not Just the End ofAiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH.
&LEEL. REv. 1387, 1399 n.51 (1995).
21. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167-68.
22. Id. at 168.
23. Id. at 191. The SEC regained the right to bring aiding and abetting claims
when Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See 15
U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (providing that "any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this title, or of
any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided").
24. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
25. The term "secondary actor" could refer to anybody who is not the issuer of
securities. The term is somewhat misleading, since the Supreme Court in Central
[Vol. 72
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making of untrue statements of material fact. These plaintiffs have alleged
that secondary actors have been so closely involved in drafting financial and
other corporate statements that they have actually made those statements in
violation of Rule lOb-5(b). Recognizing that such liability could easily run
afoul of the restrictive standard of Central Bank, courts have adopted three
theories in order to delineate when the decisions have been "made" by the
secondary actors and when the secondary actors only assist in making the
statements, thus being at most aiders and abettors. 26 The three tests are the
"bright line" test, the "substantial participation" test, and the "creation of
misrepresentation" tests.
The courts applying the "bright line" test require that the secondary ac-
tor make the fraudulent statements, and that the statements be attributed to the
secondary actor.27 The secondary actor can then be liable when its misstate-
ments have been actually released to a purchaser of securities. 28 However, it
is rarely the case that those types of secondary actors actually make mislead-
ing statements themselves. It is much more common that they participate in
drafting, reviewing and editing documents that are later released in the name
of the primary actor. Thus, the "bright line" test is usually fatal for securities
fraud claims against secondary actors. 29 A somewhat more relaxed version
Bank held that there is only "primary" liability for securities fraud. See supra text
accompanying note 24. Thus, according to the Supreme Court "secondary actors"
cannot by definition be liable for securities fraud, but can only be liable if they actu-
ally are "primary" actors. The term "secondary actor" is, however, used almost uni-
versally and it usually denotes any actor who did not issue the security in question.
26. See generally, Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Expanding the Scope of Securities Fraud?
The Shifting Sands of Central Bank, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 25, 33-41 (2003) (describing
two of the three tests); Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central
Bank of Denver after Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REv. 367, 373-78 (2006)
(describing three tests).
27. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998)
(dismissing a claim against an auditor when the fraudulent statement by the company
never mentioned the auditor and even declared that the information was unaudited,
even though the auditor had in fact approved the statements); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l,
Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (1 lth Cir. 2001) ("alleged misstatement or omission upon
which a plaintiff relied must have been publicly attributable to the defendant at the
time that the plaintiff's investment decision was made").
28. For example, auditors can be liable for signing financial statements, attesting
to their truthfulness. See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
29. The "bright line" test struggles in its handling of the liability of corporate
officers or other employees who drafted corporate statements, since those statements
might not be directly and publicly attributable to them. The Second Circuit, normally
adhering to the "bright line" test, found it to be crucial in one case that the particular
officer was "primarily responsible for [Defendant's] communications with investors
and industry analysts" and that the officer "was involved in the drafting, producing,
reviewing and/or disseminating of the false and misleading statements." Hollin v.
Scholastic Corp. (In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig.), 252 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2001).
2007]
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of the "bright line" test allows the attribution to be indirect, e.g. when the
investors know that the secondary actor, such as an auditor, is behind the
30
statements. Still, the auditor itself needs to make the statement.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a more lenient "substantial participation"
theory.31 For the courts applying this theory, even when the secondary actor
does not directly make the misleading statements itself, "substantial participa-
tion or intricate involvement" in making the statements is sufficient. 32
The third theory follows a "creation of misrepresentation" test. Under
this test, following a suggestion of the SEC, a person can be liable as a pri-
mary violator if he or she, "acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresen-
tation [and] acts with the requisite scienter." 33 One of the most notorious
In that case, the Second Circuit held that a book publisher's vice president for finance
and investor relations was sufficiently responsible for the company's communications
with investors and analysts to be held liable for corporate misstatements. See id.
However, there is yet no coherent theory for holding corporate officers and other
employees liable for fraudulent statements attributable to the corporation. See, e.g., In
re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Sec. Litig., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1144-45 (D. Colo. 2005)
(stating that corporate directors and officers can be held liable under the "group publi-
cation doctrine"). If, but only if, officers have "possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies" of a corpora-
tion, they can be held liable as "control persons" under section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act. See Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir.
1998).
30. See Filler v. Lemout (In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.), 230 F. Supp. 2d
152, 166-67 (D. Mass. 2002) (sustaining claims against affiliates of the auditing firm
KPMG whose role was widely disseminated to the public and where investors rea-
sonably attributed some statements to it, even though the auditor itself was not pub-
licly disclosed to be the author of the fraudulent statements); see also In re Global
Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("investors...
could easily have relied on the accounting firm's involvement in making any public
financial reports, even where a particular statement was not publicly attributed to it").
31. See, e.g., Scott Siamas, Comment, Primary Securities Fraud Liability for
Secondary Actors: Revisiting Cental Bank of Denver in the Wake of Enron, Worldcom
and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 895, 906-07 (2004) (describing the
substantial participation test).
32. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (dis-
cussing liability of corporate officers); see also Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. (In
re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (accounting firm can
be liable if it was "intricately involved" in preparing the fraudulent documents). Some
circuits have expressly rejected this test. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.,
77 F.3d 1215, 1226 n.10 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to follow case-law employing the
substantial participation test "[t]o the extent these cases allow liability to attach with-
out requiring a representation to be made by defendant").
33. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing approvingly a test proposed by the
SEC); see also Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d
[Vol. 72
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instances where a district court has adopted the "creation of misrepresenta-
tion" standard is the assessment of the participation of the law firm Vinson &
Elkins in the Enron accounting fraud.34 In that case, the district court refused
to dismiss claims against Vinson & Elkins, who had allegedly prepared the
transactions for, and participated in the structuring of various sham entities
employed by Enron to conceal its financial position.
35
Reliance on Rule lOb-5(b) has thus produced a clear split between dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The Second Circuit follows the "bright line" test requir-
ing attribution of statements (or at least, likely attribution). The Ninth Circuit
employs the "substantial participation" test, requiring that the secondary actor
be substantially involved in making the misstatements. Finally, a few district
courts follow the SEC-favored "creation of misrepresentation" test. Rule lOb-
5(b) case law, even though conflicting, is relatively well delineated.
B. Scheme Liability
Unlike the courts' reactions to the preceding three theories of liability,
their differences with respect to the scheme liability theory have been more
obscure. This theory relies not on Rule lOb-5(b), which prohibits making
fraudulent statements and refraining from certain omissions, but on Rule lOb-
5(a) and (c). Under these provisions, a defendant can be held liable for em-
ploying a "device, scheme or artifice" to defraud, and for engaging in "any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person."
36
Traditionally (and before Central Bank), scheme liability has been ap-
plied in very limited circumstances involving market manipulation. 37 Be-
cause of the availability of the aiding and abetting of misrepresentation claim,
there was no need to allege scheme liability separately. However, when aid-
1324, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998) ("a secondary actor can be primarily liable when it, act-
ing alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation even if the misrepresentation is
not publicly attributed to it").
34. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 656-69 (refusing to dismiss the lob-5 claim
against Vinson & Elkins).
35. Id.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c).
37. Market manipulation refers to practices such as "wash sales,. matched orders,
or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977). For example,
wash sale takes place when an individual is both the buyer and the seller of the secu-
rity. Such transaction might create a "buzz" about the security, inducing other, un-
suspecting investors to purchase the security, usually at an artificially elevated price
level. See generally Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Reevaluating the Pleading Requirements for Market Manipu-
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ing and abetting claims were foreclosed by Central Bank, scheme liability
rose to prominence.
38
In 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision that drew additional atten-
tion to scheme liability. SEC v. Zandford is the primary case interpreting
Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) in the post-Central Bank era. 39 In that case, a stock
broker sold his customer's securities but then used the proceeds for his own
benefit. 40 The Supreme Court held that the broker violated Rule 10b-5(a) and
(C) 41 and thus committed securities fraud against his own customer.42
Case law regarding scheme liability started to develop even more
quickly after the first substantive decision in the Enron litigation 43 serving "as
a template for theories of 'scheme' liability." 44 In that case, not only did the
district court utilize the "creation of misrepresentation" test,45 but it also re-
ferred to the scheme liability of various secondary actors such as law firms,
38. See, e.g., SEC v. Jakubowski, 912 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
("Most cases concerning Rule 10b-5 focus on subpart (b) and largely ignore subpart
(a)... and subpart (c) .... Notwithstanding the relatively vague language of sub-
parts (a) and (c), the courts, the Commission, and private parties might look more
closely at subparts (a) and (c) in future cases, especially those involving 'novel' forms
of fraud.").
39. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
40. Id. at 815.
41. See id. at 819 (citing provisions from subsections (a) and (c), but not from
subsection (b)).
42. Id. at 820.
43. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). This case has prompted various authors to
examine secondary actor liability in depth. See, e.g., Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron
Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
447 (2003); Aegis J. Frumento, Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors in the Sale of
Securities: Does In re Enron square with Central Bank?, 59 Bus. LAW. 975 (2004);
Taylor, supra note 26; Siamas, supra note 31.
44. Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liability Under Rules lOb-5(a) & (c), 31 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 631, 645 (2006). See also Matthew L. Mustokoff, "Scheme" Liability Un-
der Rule lOb-5: The New Battleground in Securities Fraud Litigation, FED. LAW.,
June 2006, at 20, 21 ("[P]laintiffs - presumably inspired by ... invocation of Rule
I Ob-5(a) and (c) in Enron... began to premise their claims against secondary actors
on theories of 'scheme' liability."). Even though Enron was certainly a famous case
adopting the scheme liability theory, it was not the first case where plaintiffs were
successful in using the theory in a case involving accounting fraud. See In re ZZZZ
Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (accounting firm can be
liable for its participation in a fraudulent scheme, not only for the misrepresentations
regarding the accounting fraud). Nor was Enron the first case where plaintiffs had
tried to hold accountants liable under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c). See, e.g., Filler v.
Lernout (In re Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.), 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 174-75 (D. Mass.
2002) (rejecting scheme liability claims against an auditor for its role in creating mis-
leading financial statements).
45. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 72
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accountants, and investment banks. More specifically, law firms, accountants
and investment banks were held to be direct participants in a scheme to de-
fraud investors because of their assistance, and sometimes their central role,
in creating various illicit special purpose entities employed to conceal En-
ron's debt.
46
The Enron decision, especially its discussion of scheme liability, pro-
vided an additional option for plaintiffs to raise charges against the lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers that helped to create misleading state-
ments. However, Enron's effect turned out to be even broader. Namely, the
plaintiffs started to allege that the contractual partners of the primary viola-
tors could also be held liable if the transactions entered into could be consid-
ered as part of the scheme to defraud. 47 Courts have tried to restrict the ex-
tent of scheme liability in the absence of aiding and abetting liability, but the
broad range of claims based on scheme liability has made it difficult. The
next section of this law summary provides an overview of those struggles.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There are various types of actors whom plaintiffs have recently tried to
hold liable under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c): accountants, attorneys, investment
banks (in their capacity as financers, advisors, underwriters, and analysts),
brokers and dealers, business partners, corporate directors, officers, and em-
ployees, and sometimes even the corporation itself where fraud was commit-
ted.48 Since cases involving each group of defendants have their own peculi-
arities, this summary provides a separate overview of cases for each group of
defendants.
A. Accountants
In recent years, at least one court has agreed with the outcome of the En-
ron litigation, holding that accountants who provide advising services can be
liable under scheme liability theory when they are extensively involved in
devising fraudulent accounting schemes. In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Securi-
46. See generally, Aguirre, supra note 43, at 488-92 (describing the court's stan-
dard in Enron when holding several secondary actors liable).
47. See infra Part III.E.
48. See infra Parts III.A-G. One also has to keep in mind that these actors pro-
vide a very different range of services to corporations. For example, accountants not
only prepare financial statements but also provide advising services. Financial insti-
tutions are involved in advising, underwriting, research analysis, brokering, as well as
financing itself. Financing can be in the form of straightforward commercial loan as
well as a complex structured finance transaction. Such transactions may have the
purpose of not only the raising of funds, but also the achievement of a favorable and
perfectly legal tax or accounting results. The above list only includes some services
that are very well-known.
20071
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ties Litigation49 involved claims filed against accountants who allegedly "dic-
tat[ed] incorrect and misleading accounting systems" for certain transactions
that inflated the reported earnings of the company audited.50 The problem
with attaching Rule 10b-5(b) liability to the accountants was that they helped
to create only some of the financial statements, whereas much of the damage
was done by statements issued after the accountants were not involved with
the company anymore. 5' The court nevertheless held that it was sufficient
that the accountant "masterminded" the misleading accounting practices used
to inflate reported revenue by being their "chief architect and executor.,
52
This gave rise to the scheme liability of the accountants.5 3
Although auditors are usually not held liable under scheme liability for
simple auditing mistakes, such liability for accountants is not completely
ruled out, at least in the motion to dismiss stage. In WM High Yield Fund v.
O'Hanlon,54 the accounting firm Deloitte & Touche allegedly issued errone-
ous opinions on financial statements that improperly inflated revenues of the
audited company. 55 There were no allegations that the auditors were in-
volved in devising the schemes. After the fraud was disclosed, the investors
brought suit under both misrepresentation theory as well as under scheme
liability theory.56 The court allowed scheme liability claims to stand against
all defendants, including Deloitte, and misrepresentation claims to stand
against Deloitte and other defendants who had made any public statements.
57
In another case, the auditors were successful in the motion to dismiss
stage. 58 The case was brought against the oil conglomerate Shell Group who
in several occasions misrepresented its oil reserves, as well as some of its
financial results.59 After the results were later corrected downwards, the
49. 322 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
50. Id. at 325. The misleading accounting practices involved reporting of long-
term revenue as immediate cash revenue and of "reciprocal swaps" that yielded no
actual revenue as producing reportable income. Id. at 325-26.
51. Id. at 335.
52. Id. at 336.
53. Id. at 337 n. 17 (stating that the accountant "may be held liable for the under-
lying fraudulent scheme to inflate the price of the Companies' stocks, [even though] it
may only be held liable for specific false statements to the extent that it can be said to
have made those statements under Rule I Ob-5(b)").
54. No. Civ. A. 04-3423, 2005 WL 1017811 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2005).
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id. at *3, *8.
57. Id. at *7. The reasoning for sustaining the scheme liability claim was not
very thorough. See id. at *8 ("Indeed, given the massive fraudulent scheme set forth
by Plaintiffs in their Complaint, ... it appears that they have set forth sufficient facts
to survive a Motion to Dismiss ... ").
58. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., No. 04-374 (JAP), 2006 WL
2355402 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2006) (mem., not for publication).
59. Id. at *1-2.
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value of its stock decreased significantly. 60 The investors alleged that Shell
Group's auditor, KPMG, actively participated in the improper accounting of
the reserves. Namely, the plaintiffs alleged that KPMG knew or at least reck-
lessly failed to discover that the financial statements were fraudulent. 6' The
court held that issuing unqualified audit opinions was at best a misrepresenta-
tion claim, and thus not actionable under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c). 62
B. Attorneys
There is only one recent reported district court case involving attorneys
against whom scheme liability claims have been raised. That case involves
an attorney who allegedly coauthored various statements that contained mis-
representations about a company that was selling securities. 63 The alleged
fraudulent scheme was simple - selling shares that were in reality worth
much less than one could predict from the representations, as well as hiding
real economic results from the investors. 64 The court dismissed the scheme
liability claims against the attorney on the ground that the complaint failed to
plead with sufficient particularity the fraudulent acts attributable to each par-
65ticipant. Despite the lack of reported cases, attorneys are clearly potential
targets in securities fraud cases, including under the scheme liability theory.66
C. Investment Banks
The liability of financial institutions providing loans, disguised by the
issuer as revenue or equity contributions, has been a central topic in the Enron
60. Id.
61. Id. at *6.
62. Id. at *10. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the fraudulent
scheme consisted of KPMG International taking over the lucrative practice of KPMG
Nigeria (the accounting fraud was committed in Nigeria). Such merger is not, "in and
of itself, manipulative or deceptive." Id.
63. Shoberg v. Clearmediaone, Inc., No. H-05-2122, 2006 WL 2709269, at *1-2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2006).
64. Id. In one instance, the financial data presented to the investors were simply
data about another company. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *4 (noting that "Plaintiffs' theory as to each defendant is unclear from
the face of the complaint").
66. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attorney as a "Moving
Target" - Client Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2006) ("When an attor-
ney's client commits fraud or other illegality, the attorney may be held liable as a
direct or indirect participant."); Marianne J. Jennings, Fraud Is the Moving Target,
Not Corporate Securities Attorneys: The Market Relevance of Firing Before Being
Fired Upon and Not Being "Shocked, Shocked" That Fraud Is Going On, 46
WASHBuRN L.J. 27, 28-29 (2006) (indicating that attorneys' potential liability has




Annus: Annus: Scheme Liability under Section 10(b)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2007
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
*67litigation. A few other cases, described below, have followed the initial
Enron cases in supporting scheme liability claims against investment banks.
As the cases will show, such liability may be based on the status of the in-
vestment bank both as an advisor as well as a provider of finances. In both
cases the courts may impose liability on the banks, even though it was the
issuer who deceived the investors in the most direct way through fraudulent
financial and other statements.
In securities litigation involving the now bankrupt international dairy
conglomerate Parmalat, 68 plaintiffs alleged securities fraud claims against
various banks providing services to the company. 69 Parmalat engaged in
sham transactions with different banks, improving the reported financial re-
sults. 70 Most importantly, the banks securitized duplicate invoices despite
knowing that the invoices were worthless. 71 The District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that by engaging in those sham transactions,
the banks had themselves employed "deceptive devices or contrivances for
purposes of Section 10(b)."72
At the same time, the court dismissed a claim against Bank of America
for a transaction involving investments in one of Parmalat's subsidiaries.
73
Bank of America, through two special purpose entities controlled by the
bank, bought 18.8% of the shares of the subsidiary for $300 million (alleg-
edly a great overvaluation), while retaining the right to sell shares back to
Parmalat group. 74 This created the appearance of a significant equity invest-
ment while, in essence, it was nothing more than a loan.75 The court held that
the transaction was not deceptive because the false appearance was created
not from the transactions, but from "the manner in which Parmalat or its audi-
tors described the transactions on Parmalat's balance sheets and elsewhere.,
76
67. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
68. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
69. Id. at 481.
70. Id.
71. Id. Parmalat sold products to retailers through wholesale dealers in two dif-
ferent ways. In both cases, dealers paid Parmalat at once. In some cases, the dealers
then sold to the retailers on their own account, sometimes acted on behalf of Parmalat.
In the latter case, Parmalat would issue an invoice to the retailer and later reimburse
the dealer the amounts already paid. The transaction in question involved the securi-
tization of the invoices issued to the retailers - the invoices were actually worthless
since the revenue from those invoices was immediately paid to the wholesalers. See
id. at 481-82.
72. Id. at 504.
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id. The parties had an agreement that such right would arise only if the sub-
sidiary would not be publicly listed, but both parties knew that this would not happen.
Id. The actual purchase of shares was financed by notes issued by the SPEs. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 505.
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Half a year later, after allowing plaintiffs to replead, the court allowed claims
against the same bank for its participation in the same transaction to stand,
while calling it "a close question. 7 7 The new allegation that persuaded the
court was that Bank of America's participation in the transaction led investors
to believe that Bank of America put significant value to the subsidiary, and
thus, to Parmalat as a whole. 78 The decision thus provides a good illustration
of the ambiguous nature of scheme liability and the importance of carefully
pleading allegations.
In 2005, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts refused to
dismiss claims against a bank that provided financing and advice to a voice
recognition company. 79 The bank allegedly knew that the money would be
used for engaging in transactions that would allow accounting for fictitious
revenue.80 The plaintiffs also alleged that the bank structured the loans so
that the fraud could succeed, and took affirmative steps to conceal the fraud
from the debtor's audit committee. 81 The court held that the bank's actions
were "integral to the fraudulent scheme," and that the bank was "a primary
architect of the scheme to finance the sham entities." 82 Therefore, the bank
could be liable under section 10(b). 8
3
Several decisions restrict the imposition of scheme liability on invest-
ment banks that are engaged in financing transactions. An early post-Enron
case taking a restrictive approach arose out of fraud in energy management
company Dynegy, Inc.84 In that case, Citigroup allegedly structured and fi-
nanced transactions that allowed Dynegy to disguise loans from Citigroup as
equity investments or even as cash flow from operations. 85 The court dis-
missed the Rule 1Ob-5 claim against Citigroup, finding that it was Dynegy
that improperly reported the transactions on its financial statements and that
Citigroup only helped Dynegy do so.8
6
Already in the case involving Parmalat, the court indicated that not all
legally questionable transactions amount to actionable securities fraud.87
77. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 414 F. Supp. 2d 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
78. Id.
79. Quaak v. Dexia S.A., 357 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (D. Mass. 2005).
80. Id. at 342.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (refusing to reconsider its holding in In re Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.,
236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2003)).
84. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Dynegy, Inc. (In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig.),
339 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
85. Id. at 819-21.
86. Id. at 916.
87. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(stating the general principle that when the bank "design[s] and enter[s] into ...
transactions knowing or even intending" that the transactions would be misrepre-
sented by the other party, they engage at most in aiding and abetting fraud).
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More recently, the district court in charge of the Enron litigation has also had
second thoughts. 88 In two decisions made in the summer of 2006, the district
court dismissed claims against two investment banks for their role in the En-
ron accounting fraud.
In June 2006, the court dismissed claims against Deutsche Bank.89
Deutsche Bank allegedly structured and later financed special purpose entities
(SPE) that were created in order to artificially and illegally inflate Enron's
reported earnings. 9° In return, Deutsche Bank received extraordinary and
rapid returns from the financing, along with high consulting fees for its ser-
vices. 91 The court held that this was not sufficient - the plaintiffs failed to
allege that Deutsche Bank was "involved in the operation" of the SPE, and
thus its behavior, at most, amounted to aiding and abetting.92 The court fur-
ther explained that there were no allegations that "Deutsche Bank established
an innately illicit deceptive entity or device."
93
In July 2006, the court dismissed some claims against Barclays Bank for
its role in financing a SPE created by Enron to hide its debt. 94 The court held
that the fraud was based on the fact that the SPE's debts (including the one to
Barclays) should have been consolidated into Enron's accounting but were
not.95 Even though Barclays was well aware of this fraud and even helped to
structure transactions related to the SPE, the court held that "fraud occurred
not in funding an entity that did not qualify as an SPE for nonconsolidation
on Enron's balance sheet; it occurred in the improper accounting by Enron
and others that did not consolidate. 96 Thus, Barclays did not commit fraud
against shareholders in connection with that particular transaction. 97
88. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA"
Litig.), 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 721 (S.D. Tex. 2006) ("In the course of this litigation,
the relevant law has evolved and been modified and clarified, often in different ways
by different courts .... [T]he court... re-examines the allegations against Barclays
[banking entities] under Central Bank's preclusion of aiding and abetting claims.").
89. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *390 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006).
90. See id. at *385.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *388.
93. Id. at *389.
94. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA"
Litig.), 439 F. Supp. 2d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2006). The ruling was based on a Rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and thus the standard for ruling was the same
as on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 695.
95. Id. at 721.
96. Id.
97. Id. In the first Enron decision, the court had held that "allegations about
Barclays' direct involvement in the formation and funding of [the SPE] are sufficient
by the very nature of the transactions to state a claim under section 10(b) and Rule
lob-5." Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2002). Not all of the third-party defendants have
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After these decisions, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that it
would restrict the scope of scheme liability even further. 98 The court first
established that the banks had not made any material misstatements in the
instances of fraud alleged in the pleadings, nor had the banks a duty to dis-
close to investors the fraudulent schemes. 99 Based on these allegations, the
court held that the banks could at best be aiders and abettors to Enron, but not
primary violators. °0 0  If the Fifth Circuit's decision is not reversed by the
Supreme Court, it is very likely that most of the banks will not be held liable
under scheme liability theory for fraud leading to Enron's demise.
As is evident from these cases, it is more likely that investment banks
could be held liable under Rule lOb-5 when they disseminate information to
the market. However, those claims are usually ordinary misrepresentation
claims and scheme liability seems redundant. It is unclear, however, whether
there is a place for scheme liability when misrepresentation claims prove
unsuccessful. In Lentell v Merrill Lynch & Co., 101 investors brought action
against an investment brokerage firm (who also acted as an investment bank),
and its former zcnalyst alleging that the defendants committed securities fraud
by issuing research reports artificially inflating stock prices. 0 2 The defen-
dants allegedly benefited from the behavior since the companies whose stock
successfully defended against scheme liability claims in recent Enron cases. For
example, the court has kept alive claims against JP Morgan based on commodity
trades where no commodity was actually ever transferred, and claims against Credit
Suisse First Boston based on its "repeated involvement in structuring SPEs for En-
ron." In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *170 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006). Of course, the Fifth Circuit's
class decertification decision reduces the viability of the claims significantly. For
another case where investment banks were dismissed from a case, see Filler v. Hanvit
Bank, 156 F. Appx. 413, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2005) (not selected for publication) (without
explicitly discussing scheme liability under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), dismissing claims
against an investment bank for allegedly engaging in sham transactions with the is-
suer, since investment bank made no misrepresentations on which plaintiffs relied
upon).
98. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,
No. 06-20856, 2007 WL 816518 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2007). The court of appeals de-
cided the case based on an interlocutory appeal from the district court's decision to
certify the plaintiffs as a single class in an action against three banks. Id. at * 1. The
court analyzed the scope of scheme liability, or more accurately, the meaning of the
term "deceptive" as used in section 10(b), as one of the issues to determine the com-
monality of the plaintiffs' claim. Id. at *6.
99. Id. at * 1. The court focused on the banks' absence of the duty to disclose to
investors fraudulent schemes. Id. at *8 (assuming that the "case primarily concerns
improper omissions").
100. Id. at *9. The court split 2-1 on that question. See id. at *21 (Dennis, C.J.,
concurring) ("[T]he majority errs by defining the term 'deceptive' in Section 10(b) in
an unduly restrictive fashion.").
101. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
102. Id. at 164.
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prices were inflated were the bank's clients, and the bank was interested in
obtaining and maintaining investment banking business.' 0 3 The court dis-
missed the scheme liability claim under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), arguing that
the claims were essentially undistinguishable from (unsuccessful) misrepre-
sentation claims. 104
In a factually similar case, the District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts came to a contrary conclusion. 105 In that case, an investment bank-
ing firm, through its analyst, allegedly issued false and misleading research
reports concerning another company.' 06 Investors in that company brought
suit both under Rule lOb-5(b) for misrepresentation, as well as under Rule
lOb-5(a) and (c) for scheme liability.' 0 7 The court refused to dismiss the
scheme liability claims, since the analyst did not just issue "one or two mis-
leading research reports," but worked "over time" and "extensively" with the
CEO of the corporation.' 0 8 This extensive cooperation amounted to partici-
pation in a scheme to defraud. 109
D. Brokers and Dealers
Brokers and dealers are by definition closely involved in securities
transactions. The following cases have discussed the application of scheme
liability to brokers and dealers in various other types of cases, both in their
capacity as a participant in a wider scheme as well as a primary violator of
securities laws. 110
In SEC v. Santos,' the defendants were a city treasurer and two bro-
kers. 112 Through paying bribes and making campaign contributions as de-
manded by the treasurer, the brokers received the city's investment business
(amounting in total to approximately $2.5 billion)." 3 The SEC brought suit,
alleging that the brokers and the treasurer were involved in a scheme that
103. Id. at 165.
104. Id. at 177. The misrepresentation claims failed because plaintiffs could not
show that the misrepresentations by Merrill Lynch caused their harm. Id.
105. Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 383 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Mass. 2004).
106. Id. at 229-30 n.5.
107. Id. at 236-38.
108. Id. at 239.
109. Id.
110. For a discussion of the Supreme Court case in SEC v. Zandford, involving a
broker stealing funds from the client, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
111. 355 F. Supp. 2d917 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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deceived the city in violation of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c). 114 The court agreed
with the SEC, refusing to dismiss claims against the defendants.' 15
In United States v. Bongiorno,116 a criminal case applying Rule lOb-
5,117 the brokers were charged for selling and purchasing stock from their
own accounts when they should have simply matched the orders they re-
ceived from investors. 8 Thereby the brokers decreased the price that the
sellers could have received (and increased the price for the buyers), while
reaping profit for themselves. 119 This behavior would be sufficient to trigger
scheme liability, despite the fact that it was only the brokers' conduct - "tak-
ing positions as specialists" - that was fraudulent.' 20 The government is still
obliged to prove that the customers were deceived - essentially, that the cus-
tomers expected the broker to match the orders and not trade from the bro-
ker's own account.' 21
In Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co.,122 the defendants were mutual funds
and their investment advisors who allegedly paid undisclosed kickbacks to
brokers-dealers who steered investors towards the mutual funds. 23 Investors
sued, alleging that the defendants violated section 10(b) by failing to disclose
to the public this kickback scheme. 24 The court disagreed, since the defen-
dants themselves had not made misleading statements and allegedly had no
duty to disclose their participation in the scheme to the public.' 
25
114. Id. at 919.
115. Id. The court also held that the brokers had the duty to disclose their bribes,
since concealing illegal activity is "intrinsically misleading" and "always violative of
Rule lOb-5(b)." Id. at 920.
116. No. 05 Cr. 390(SHS), 2006 WL 1140864 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006).
117. Rule lob-5 is interpreted in the same way in criminal and civil cases. See In
re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 388 n.164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
118. Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *7. The court explicitly left it open whether the brokers owed fiduciary
duties to investors requiring brokers to disclose their actions. The court thus based
the brokers' liability on their conduct only, and not on omissions. Id. See also United
States v. Finnerty, Nos. 05 Cr.393 DC, 05 Cr. 397 DC, 2006 WL 2802042, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006) (same).
121. See United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(acquitting a broker after a guilty jury verdict on the basis that government provided
no evidence of customer expectations).
122. No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 WL 3041090 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id. at *11 ("[M]isleading statements about a company's role in a scheme is
not the same as that company itself misleading investors.").
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E. Business Partners
Plaintiffs have also tried to impose scheme liability on business partners
other than providers of capital. One district court has refused to dismiss such
claims. 126  In that case, Lemout & Hauspie, a speech recognition device
manufacturer, used "strategic partners" to fraudulently inflate its revenues.'27
The plaintiffs brought suit against two legitimate business partners of Lernout
& Hauspie, who created and sometimes funded the sham "strategic part-
ners." ' 28  The court refused to dismiss scheme liability claims against the
defendants, arguing that the partners "substantially participated in the strate-
gic-partner scheme."' 
29
Two recent cases from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have refused to
impose scheme liability on business partners, even in cases where the partners
know of the deception by the primary violator. In a case involving inflation
of revenues by Charter Communications, 130 the allegations were made among
other defendants against Charter's suppliers. 131 Charter Communications is a
cable service provider who uses set-top boxes for providing service.' 32 It had
contracted with manufacturers of such boxes on a fixed price basis for a fore-
seeable future when the deceptive transactions occurred. 133 Despite having
all its needs regarding the boxes met, Charter allegedly agreed with its set-top
box providers that it would pay an extra $20 for each box, and in return
would receive the money back in advertisement fees.' 34 The plaintiffs al-
leged that such transactions were a sham since they had no economic sub-
stance. 135 Charter then reported the extra $20 per box (a total of $17 million)
as extra operating cash flow and revenue.136 These sham transactions en-
abled Charter to meet the expectations of financial analysts with regards to its
126. Filler v. Lemout (In re Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.), 236 F. Supp. 2d 161
(D. Mass. 2003).
127. Id. at 166. There were two main elements to the fraud. First, the outside
world was led to believe that the partners were independent, start-up software compa-
nies, while they were actually entities controlled by Lemout & Hauspie and its other
business partners. Id. Second, Lernout & Hauspie created sham revenue by licensing
its software to the "strategic partners" who were actually mere shells, without any
ability to conduct business. Id.
128. Id. at 167.
129. Id. at 175-76.
130. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc. (In re Charter Com-
munications, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75
U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-43).
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revenues and operating cash flow. 1 37 The plaintiffs alleged that the manufac-
turers knew that Charter intended to account for the sham transactions im-
properly and that analysts would rely on the inflated revenues and operating
cash flow in making stock recommendations. 1
38
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, dismissing the Rule 1Ob-5 actions against the manufacturers of the set-
top boxes. The court based its decision on the fact that the manufacturers
"did not issue any misstatement relied upon by the investing public, nor were
they under a duty to Charter investors and analysts to disclose information
useful in evaluating Charter's true financial condition."' 39 Thus, there can be
no Rule 1 Ob-5 liability absent a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant. The court further warned against imposing Rule 1 Ob-5 liability on
a business partner "to an arm's length business transaction," since this could
"introduce potentially far-reaching duties and uncertainties for those engaged
in day-to-day business dealings." 1
40
In a similar case from the Ninth Circuit, Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
Inc., 141 plaintiffs sued, among others, the business partners of
Homestore.com, an online real estate company. 142 The defendants were en-
gaged in complex three-way transactions. In one type of transaction,
Homestore.com would purchase services or products that it did not need from
third companies, in return for that company's promise to purchase advertising
on Homestore.com's website through AOL.143 AOL retained a commission
and delivered the rest of the advertisement money to Homestore.com.
144
Homestore.com accounted for those proceeds as revenue, inflating its re-
ported income to the public. 145 The court dismissed the claims against both
AOL and the third parties. 146 AOL was held to be at most an aider and abet-
tor in its role of simply helping Homestore.com in organizing and creating the
137. Id. at 990.
138. Id. at 989-90.
139. Id. at 992.
140. Id. at 992-93. See also Dutton v. D & K Healthcare Res., No.
4:04CV147SNL, 2006 WL 1778863, at *6-8 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2006) (adopting the
Charter Communications standard and dismissing claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturer who allegedly sold excessively large quantities of drugs to the defen-
dant allowing both entities to state large transaction volumes, while the correct ac-
counting should have indicated that the "sales" were actually consignments).
141. 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'g In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
252 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
142. Id. at 1043.
143. Id. at 1044. The parties did not engage in direct barter transactions because it
would have been obvious to the accountants and auditors that Homestore.com could
not account for advertisement proceeds as revenue. Id. at 1043.
144. Id. at 1044.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1052.
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three-way transactions. 147 Also, the court determined that AOL did not en-
gage in fraudulent activities itself, since there was no indication that the
transactions it was involved in were "completely illegitimate or in themselves
created a false appearance."' 148 There were no allegations that AOL entered
into a "transaction that had no legitimate economic value" since advertise-
ments were actually purchased and sold. '
49
The Ninth Circuit's test of scheme liability differed from that of the
Eighth Circuit, though. A material misrepresentation or omission is not an
absolute precondition for imposing-scheme liability. It is sufficient when the
defendant "engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and effect of
creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme."' 150 Not all
participants in fraudulent transactions are liable, though. The fact that a
transaction is fraudulent is not enough; it is necessary that the defendant itself
engaged in conduct having deceptive purpose and effect. 151
F. Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees
The courts rarely refuse to dismiss claims against corporate directors,
officers, and employees who are very closely associated with the corporate
statements, even though the courts cannot converge on the legal basis for
allowing such claims.152 Therefore, it is not surprising that some courts re-
sort to scheme liability.
For example, in SEC v. Hopper,153 a company had made false state-
ments regarding transaction volumes and revenues of one of its subsidiar-
ies. 154 The District Court for the Southern District of Texas refused to dis-
miss the lawsuit against the CEO of the corporation and the CEO of the sub-
sidiary. 155 In addition to sustaining misrepresentation claims against them,
the court also held that they were sufficiently involved in the transactions that
led to the fraudulent statements that they could be liable under Rule lOb-5(a)
and (c). 156 The court relied on the fact that the transactions were a sham, and
had "an inherent tendency to deceive."' 157 Therefore, those transactions were
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1053. The claims against the third parties were dismissed for similar
reasons - the plaintiff had not alleged that the third parties "acted with the purpose
and effect of creating a false appearance" in the transactions. Id. at 1054.
150. Id. at 1048.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 29.
153. No. Civ.A. H-04-1054, 2006 WL 778640 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006).
154. Id. at *10.
155. Id.
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not only the basis for fraudulent statements, but also fraudulent and deceptive
themselves. 158
Similarly, scheme liability was invoked in a case where corporate offi-
cers implemented a fraudulent billing scheme, with the effect being that the
company overcharged its customers and thus illegally obtained additional
revenue. 159 Besides sustaining an ordinary misrepresentation claim based on
Rule lOb-5(b), the court held that the plaintiff had "adequately pleaded
scheme liability" under section 10(b). 160 In another case, the defendant was
the CEO of the investment banking division of Citigroup. 161 The division was
responsible, among other duties, for preparing research analysis reports on
various corporations. 162 The alleged fraud involved issuing false reports
about a particular corporation in order to inflate the value of that corpora-
tion's stock, but also to secure lucrative investment banking business from
it. 163 Since the CEO did not make any statements himself, the plaintiffs
based their claim on scheme liability. 164 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York refused to dismiss the scheme liability claim, agreeing
with the plaintiffs that the CEO was "a central and knowing participant in,




159. Steiner v. Medquist Inc., No. 04-5487 (JBS), 2006 WL 2827740, at *21-22
(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006).
160. Id. at *21.
161. In re Salomon Analyst AT & T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458-59
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
162. Id. at 459.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 472-73.
165. Id. at 474. See also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 377 (D. Md. 2004) (applying scheme liability theory alongside a simple
misrepresentation claim when the corporate officer was involved in artificially inflat-
ing corporation's revenues); In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Sec. Litig., 387 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1143, 1145 (D. Colo. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs' claim against corporate
officers was also based on scheme liability, and refusing to dismiss those claims de-
spite the fact that the officers themselves did not make any misstatements since the
officers were part of the group drafting the documents); Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v.
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., No .Civ. 04CV0782REBCBS, 2005 WL 2359311, at *9
(D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2005) (refusing to dismiss claims against corporate officers who
allegedly manipulated corporation's transactions resulting in improperly recognized
revenue, despite the fact that the officers never made any false statements); SEC v.
PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (not-
ing that "there may be circumstances under which [an] . . . executive ... could be
charged with primary liability for false or misleading statements formally made by
another," while discussing participation in a fraudulent scheme under Rule lob-5
generally); WM High Yield Fund v. O'Hanlon, No. Civ.A. 04-3423, 2005 WL
1017811, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2005) (refusing to dismiss claims against corporate
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G. Issuers
Usually, it is unnecessary to resort to scheme liability theories against
issuers of securities, since the fraud is normally committed by the issuer
through its misrepresentations, omissions or manipulations. However, when
the issuer has not itself made the fraudulent misrepresentation, courts have
resorted to scheme liability against them as well. The primary scheme liabil-
ity case against an issuer, Cooper v. Pickett,166 in fact pre-dates Enron and
Zandford. In Cooper, corporate officers allegedly told securities analysts that
the corporation's business was strong. 167 The analysts, based on these com-
munications, issued favorable research reports. 168 When it turned out that the
business was actually rather weak and the corporation's stock plummeted,
shareholders sued.169 The defendant argued that it did not make any public
statements on its own and thus Central Bank would preclude its liability un-
der Rule 1Ob-5. 170 The court, holding that Central Bank did not preclude the
claim against the corporation, stated that the corporation and analysts "to-
gether engaged in a scheme to defraud the shareholders."' 71 Thus, claims
against an issuer may stand even when the issuer has not made a public mis-
representation or omission. i72
officers for scheme liability despite dismissing claims against them for misrepresenta-
tions since the officers did not make any statements).
166. 137 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
167. Id. at 620.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 624.
171. Id. at 625. The court explicitly referred to Rule lOb-5(a). Id. at 624. How-
ever, it also stated that the corporation was "liable for its own false statements to the
analysts." Id. (citing Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995)). This reasoning is unclear. The
court clearly did not want to imply that statements between participants in the fraudu-
lent schemes should in themselves give rise to a misrepresentation claims under Rule
10b-5(b). Moreover, the authority the court cites stands for the proposition that sub-
stantial participation in creating misrepresentations are sufficient for holding a secon-
dary actor liable. See supra note 32. This theory is discredited in most circuits that
have considered the issue. See supra, notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
172. More recent decisions cite Cooper favorably. See, e.g., In re Splash Tech.
Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 99-00109 SBA, 2000 WL 1727377, at *17 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) ("[I]f the corporate insider provides false or misleading informa-
tion to the security analyst, then he may be directly liable under 10b-5.").
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IV. DISCUSSION
After the Central Bank case in 1994,173 the Supreme Court has not pro-
vided more extensive guidelines for determining the limits of secondary actor
liability under Rule 1Ob-5. The Supreme Court has also provided very little
guidance as to the proper interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c). Therefore,
as the above summary shows, it is unsurprising that lower courts have come
to different conclusions regarding the scope of scheme liability under Rule
lOb-5.
The following discussion starts with outlining the central controversy
regarding scheme liability claims - whether the defendant must have made a
material misrepresentation or omission to be liable under Rule 1 Ob-5.174 To
resolve this controversy, the discussion first addresses the policy goals of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.175 Thereafter, it will be shown that the
restrictive approach of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits has serious shortcom-
ings. 176 However, the tests utilized by courts taking a broader approach are
far from perfect as well. 177 Therefore, this summary concludes that a more
nuanced approach should be taken, depending on the types of defendants
against whom scheme liability is alleged. The courts should refrain from
searching for an all-encompassing test of scheme liability.' 
78
A. Relationship Between Scheme Liability and Misrepresenta-
tion/Omission Liability
Even though the cases summarized above are based on different fact
patterns, the overarching controversy where the courts' opinions differ is the
same. Some courts, including the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, hold that there
are only three bases for liability under section 10(b): misrepresentation, omis-
sion when there is a duty to speak, and market manipulation.' 79 Some courts
173. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994).
174. See infra Part IV.A.
175. See infra Part IV.B.
176. See infra Part IV.C.
177. See infra Part IV.D.
178. See infra Part IV.E.
179. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,
No. 06-20856, 2007 WL 816518, at *10 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2007); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc. (In re Charter Communications, Inc., Sec.
Litig.), 443 F.3d 987, 992 (2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. Mar. 26,
2007) (No. 06-43); In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1461, 1472
(N.D. IIl. 1996), abrogated on other issues by Damato v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464
(7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "10b- 5 claims must allege either (1) material misstate-
ments or (2) material omissions by a person having a duty to disclose"); Dutton v. D
& K Healthcare Resources, No. 4:04CV147SNL, 2006 WL 1778863, at *6-8 (E.D.
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reach essentially the same result in cases where scheme liability is alleged
alongside misrepresentation liability. These courts argue that there is no
claim under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) when the claim is essentially based on
misrepresentations or omissions.' Thus, according to those courts, scheme
liability has no independent existence outside the misrepresentation claim.
Other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, reject this restrictive view, and
find that section 10(b) does not require that a defendant make a material mis-
representation or omission, or that it engage in market manipulation. 81 The
courts require only that the conduct be deceptive.'82 Thus, scheme liability
claims may proceed alongside misrepresentation claims.' 83 Some courts base
Mo. June 23, 2006) (dismissing claims against business partners who made no public
statements); see generally McLaughlin, supra note 44, at 631 (advocating the adop-
tion of this restrictive approach).
180. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (reject-
ing scheme liability when "the sole basis for such claims is alleged misrepresentations
or omissions"); SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (it
would be improper to impose scheme liability against an auditor when "the core mis-
conduct alleged is in fact a misstatement"); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv.
Litig., No. 2:03-MD-1565, 2006 WL 469468, at *21 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2006)
(scheme liability is inappropriate when the allegations "merely repeat[] the allegations
made in support of Plaintiffs' misrepresentation and omission claim"); In re Recoton
Corp. Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (refusing to ana-
lyze scheme liability claims that were based on alleged misrepresentations and omis-
sions); JHW Greentree Capital, L.P. v. Whittier Trust Co., No. 05 Civ.2985 HB, 2005
WL 3008452, at *7 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005) (stating that plaintiffs did not
sufficiently allege scheme liability since they did not plead any allegations against the
defendant personally, "apart from her alleged misrepresentations and omissions"); In
re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (arguing that
since the complaint is based on misstatements, the plaintiffs could only rely on the
misstatements and not on any scheme); In re Redback Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
C03-5642 JF (HRL), 2006 WL 1805579, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2006) ("[D]espite
the fact that Plaintiffs attempt to characterize their second claim as a 'manipulative
act' claim rather than a 'misstatements and omissions' claim, the Court will treat
claim two as duplicative of [misstatements and omissions] claim .... ).
181. See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir.
2006) ("Defendants argue that imposing liability for participation in an overall
scheme to defraud would impose liability for conduct other than the making of a ma-
terial misstatement or omission and would conflict with Central Bank. We dis-
agree."); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reject-
ing the suggestion that scheme liability applies only in cases of market manipulation
in a technical sense).
182. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of this approach.
183. See, e.g., SEC v. Hopper, No. Civ.A. H-04-1054, 2006 WL 778640 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 24, 2006) (sustaining Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c) claims alongside misrepresen-
tation claims against corporate officers who entered into sham transactions inflating
corporation's revenues); Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 383 F. Supp. 2d 223,
239 (D. Mass. 2004) ("If [the statements and omissions] were part of a broader
fraudulent 'scheme,' 'practice,' or 'course of business,' then they might allege some-
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this conclusion on the text of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c).184 Some courts rely di-
rectly on section 10(b), for example, arguing that "manipulative" conduct is
not necessarily restricted to market manipulation activities in the narrow
sense. 185 This controversy - whether scheme liability has independent sig-
nificance beyond claims of misrepresentation/omission and market manipula-
tion - is also the central controversy in the pending appeal before the Su-
preme Court in Charter Communications. 186
thing slightly different from a Rule lOb-5(b) claim .... ); WM High Yield Fund v.
O'Hanlon, No. Civ.A. 04-3423, 2005 WL 1017811, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2005)
(refusing to dismiss scheme liability claims, even though dismissing misrepresenta-
tion claims, based on same facts, against defendants who had not made public state-
ments); United States v. Bongiomo, No. 05 Cr. 390(SHS), 2006 WL 1140864, at *7-9
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006) (analyzing claims based on conduct and omission sepa-
rately). However, the courts sometimes require the plaintiffs to show that there is at
least some deceptive conduct beyond misrepresentation if scheme liability is to be
applicable. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 475 (stating
that a defendant can be liable for scheme liability even if it has not made any misrep-
resentations, but "participated in scheme that encompassed conduct beyond misrepre-
sentation"); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., No. 04-374 (JAP), 2006 WL
2355402, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2006) (designed as not for publication) (in order to
invoke scheme liability, allegations "must entail a defendant's undertaking of a de-
ceptive scheme or course of conduct that went beyond misrepresentations").
184. See, e.g., Hopper, 2006 WL 778640, at *11-12.
185. See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (arguing that designing of accounting fraud schemes by an outside
auditor was manipulative in the meaning of section 10(b)). The courts rejecting the
restrictive view of scheme liability do not have a uniform approach to what kind of
behavior amounts to actionable scheme. See infra Part IV.C.
186. The Supreme Court will answer the question whether Central Bank fore-
closes section 10(b) claims where defendants engaged in transactions with a public
corporation only in order to inflate the financial statements of that corporation, but
"themselves made no public statements" conceming those transactions. See Ques-
tions Presented, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/06-
00043qp.pdf. Interestingly, the defendants in Charter Communications who opposed
granting of certiorari in the Supreme Court argued that there was no split among the
circuit courts, and that the question was well settled. See Brief in Opposition for Re-
spondent Motorola, Inc., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No.
06-43, 2006 WL 3024291, at *5 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2006) ("[T]he Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion was squarely in line with the decisions of [the Supreme Court] and the consistent
interpretations of Central Bank by Courts of Appeals and District Courts that have
considered the issue."). Defendants in Simpson argued to the contrary: "The question
presented is a discrete and important issue of federal statutory law that has been the
subject of extremely thorough, albeit conflicting, analyses and holdings by the circuit
courts and district courts throughout the country." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Cendant Corp. v. Cal. State Teachers Ret. Sys., No. 06-560, 2006 WL 3024299, at
*10 (filed U.S. Oct. 19, 2006).
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Unsurprisingly, both sides of the controversy appeal to the previous Su-
preme Court rulings on the extent of Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c) claims. For ex-
ample, the supporters of the restrictive approach cite the following from the
Central Bank decision: "[W]e again conclude that the statute prohibits only
the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a
manipulative act."' 87 The supporters of the broader approach cite to state-
ments that imply that Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) are not restricted to misstatements
and omissions, but can encompass that conduct. 188 They specifically refer to
the recent Zandford decision, where the Supreme Court held that a broker
employed a fraudulent scheme when it basically stole the client's money.89
The Supreme Court in Zanford stated: "Indeed, each time respondent 'exer-
cised his power of disposition [of his customers' securities] for his own bene-
fit,' that conduct, 'without more,' was a fraud."' 190 The supporters of the re-
strictive view, however, claim that the theory used in Zandford was based on
a violation of a duty to disclose (i.e. omission) on the part of the broker who
had fiduciary duties towards his client, and thus the Rule 1Ob-5 claim was
nothing very novel. 191
Some of the cases cited above were decided before Central Bank, and in
Central Bank itself the narrow question presented was the existence of aiding
and abetting liability, not the extent of scheme liability. 192 Since Central
Bank did not address scheme liability or the extent of Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c),
both sides of the debate rely, at best, on dicta. The Court has never faced a
case in the post-Central Bank environment where the existence of a scheme
liability claim absent a misrepresentation, omission or market manipulation
would have made a difference in the outcome of the case. Therefore, in order
to determine whether these provisions give rise to liability absent a material
misrepresentation or omission, the text of the Rule and policy behind it have
to be analyzed in more detail.
187. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. However, right after making the statement, the
court cites to Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977), where the
court held that the "language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception" (emphasis added).
188. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) ("To be
sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue statement
of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact. The first and third subpara-
graphs are not so restricted."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976)
(implying that Rule lob-5 proscribes "any type of material misstatement or omission,
and any course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors" (emphasis
added)).
189. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
190. Id at 821 (emphasis added).
191. See McLaughlin, supra note 44, at 648-59; Markel & Ballard, supra note 8,
at 995 n.10.
192. The plaintiffs in Central Bank conceded that the defendant was an aider and
abettor, and not a primary actor. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
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B. Policy of Scheme Liability
The policy arguments relevant to delineating scheme liability claims
point in different directions. On one hand, the securities laws help to ensure
honest and efficient functioning of the capital markets.'1 93 Private securities
litigation can be "a most effective weapon" in enforcing securities laws, serv-
ing as a supplement to SEC action.19 Furthermore, the statute "should be
construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its reme-
dial purposes."195 As a result of this flexible construction, section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 are supposed to "prohibit all fraudulent schemes ... whether the
artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique
form of deception."'
96
On the other hand, the liability should not be excessive. The two main
policy reasons for precluding aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank
were the need for predictability of consequences of business transactions, and
the need to prevent unnecessary and unduly burdensome litigation.'97 When
the scope of liability is uncertain, then business transactions that could poten-
tially create such liability are costly. For example, using aiding and abetting
liability makes the scope of potential liability very unpredictable, since such a
claim rests on a vague notion of "substantial assistance" to the primary viola-
tor. 198 Unnecessary and burdensome litigation can arise from unclear rules
especially because of the nature of securities litigation - the defendants have
a lot at stake and face high trial costs and potential extensive liability. There-
fore, they would have a strong motivation to settle.' 
99
The Enron case offers an example of how scheme liability claims pro-
duced such a strong motivation to settle. As noted above, the court initially
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000) (stating that one goal of securities regulation is "to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions").
194. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985).
195. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (citation omitted).
196. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971).
See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) ("[Rule
lOb-5] proscriptions, by statute and rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the word
'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive.").
197. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994).
198. Id. at 189 (stating that "rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are
unclear," leading to "decisions made on ad hoc basis, offering little predictability"
(quotation marks omitted)).
199. Since SEC has gained the right to institute legal actions against aiders and
abettors, see supra note 23, businesses cannot very well argue that they do not know
whether their behavior is illegal or not - aiding and abetting securities fraud remains
illegal. However, giving a private right of action for such an offense is a different
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refused to dismiss claims against various investment banks for their participa-
tion in the Enron accounting scandal.200 However, several years later, the
district court itself changed its mind with regard to the extent of scheme li-
ability, 20 1 and then the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals essentially rejected the
applicability of scheme liability against most of the banks altogether.202 In the
meantime, several investment banks settled out of the case, with the cost in
203the billions. Even though the banks contested the applicability of scheme
liability - certainly a very novel and controversial theory - against them, the
pressure to settle was great enough to not wait for an appellate ruling on the
issue. In hindsight, the settlement might have been premature from the view-
point of the banks. 204
Unfortunately, since policy considerations behind section 10(b) are con-
flicting, they provide little help in determining the scope of the scheme liabil-
ity claims. On the one hand, liability should be broad to give effect to the
policy of investor protection. On the other hand, it should be narrow, or at
least easily predictable, to avoid unnecessary litigation. The Fifth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits all advance at least one of the policies behind the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.
C. Restrictive View of Scheme Liability
The restrictive view of scheme liability, adopted by the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, follows the policy of preventing unnecessary and burdensome litiga-
tion. Indeed, requiring the defendant itself to make a misleading statement,
200. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. In fact, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the narrow scope of scheme liability would prevent 'in
terrorem settlements.' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., No. 06-20856, 2007 WL 816518, at *14 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2007) (quot-
ing Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1363 (N.D. Tex.
1979)).
203. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, J.P. Morgan Chase to Pay Enron Investors $2.2
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at C1; Jennifer Bayot, Citigroup to Pay $2 Billion
in Enron Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at A1; Jeff Bailey, CIBC Pays to Settle
Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, C1 (settling the case for $2.4 billion). Bar-
clays Bank, dismissed from the lawsuit in 2006, never settled its securities fraud case.
It later paid $144 million to settle the claim filed against it in a related bankruptcy
case. See Barclays to Pay $144 Million to Settle Lawsuit with Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2006, at C4.
204. See, e.g., Enron Litigation: Laying Down, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2007, at 33
(stating that considering the Fifth Circuit's decision, "the banks look to have made an
unwise bet"). Just about a week later, the bet looked somewhat better, since the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Charter Communications, indicating that the banks'
liability is at least a very contentious issue. See U.S. Securities Litigation, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2007, at 16 ("[D]ecision to settle starts to look a lot better.").
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breach a duty to disclose or commit market manipulation can get rid of many
claims brought against accountants, investment banks, attorneys, and other
actors. However, if the policy of preventing unnecessary litigation was the
only policy goal behind securities laws, the perfect rule would be to eliminate
private litigation altogether. Since the laws also strive to prevent securities
fraud, restricting litigation cannot in itself dictate the result in interpreting
section 10(b).
The restrictive view is clearly not firmly founded on the language of
Rule lOb-5. Rule lOb-5(b) covers misrepresentation and omission claims.
20 5
This leaves large parts of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) without a clear application,
since they clearly cover more than simple market manipulation. 206 Legal
rules should not be interpreted in a way that leaves them with no meaning and
application whatsoever. 207
One could argue that Rule lOb-5 is broader than the statutory authority
for it and that therefore only the text of section 10(b) is controlling. 2 8 Sec-
205. It is prohibited "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(b) (2006). Some failure to disclose claims are based on Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c), and not on Rule lOb-5(b), since the latter rule prohibits omissions only when
there are previous statements made that need to be corrected. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 n.5 (1980) ("Only Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) are at issue here..
. The portion of the indictment based on [Rule I 0b-5(b)] was dismissed because the
petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchase of stock.");
United States v. Bongiomo, No. 05 Cr. 390(SHS), 2006 WL 1140864, at *7-9
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006) (holding that brokers could be liable under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and
(c) but not under Rule 1Ob-5(b) for not disclosing that they were improperly trading
stocks, since they had made no previous statements that needed to be corrected).
However, such failure to disclose cases cannot be the primary targets of Rule 1 Ob-5(a)
and (c).
206. According to Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), it is prohibited to "employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" and to "engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c). Clearly, those provisions should cover more than market
manipulation only. See also Brief in Opposition, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal.
State Teachers' Ret. Sys., No. 06-560, 2007 WL 432471, at *16 (U.S. Feb. 7, 2007)
(arguing that each subsection of Rule lob-5 must have its own independent meaning);
Schanbaum, supra note 8, at 221-22 (same).
207. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (noting that
provisions of statutory enactments should not be constructed so that some other provi-
sions of the same statute would be superfluous).
208. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 173 (2004) ("[A] private plaintiff may not bring a lob-5 suit against a de-
fendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)."); but see SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002) ("The scope of Rule 1Ob-5 is coextensive with the coverage
of § 10(b) .. " (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) and Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976))).
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tion 10(b) prohibits anyone from "directly or indirectly" using of "any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. ' 'z 9 Again, the use of "any"
deceptive device or contrivance is prohibited, not only the use of fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions. By requiring the defendant to make a
fraudulent misstatement or omission or to engage in market manipulation,
2 10
the statutory text is narrowed to the extent that it is hard to see what meaning
some of the words in the statute ("any", "indirectly") retain.211
Despite these textual problems, the restrictive view could be supported
by arguments that section 10(b) liability presumes reliance by the plaintiff on
the defendant's fraudulent conduct, and that absent misrepresentation by de-
212 213fendant, there can be no such reliance. Even if this argument wins, the
restrictive view cannot solve some types of cases satisfactorily.
Namely, the restrictive view can unduly limit liability where the defen-
dant is closely associated with the issuer, or the defendant is the issuer him-
self. For example, corporate officers and other employees who prepare cor-
porate statements and mastermind accounting fraud are not necessarily identi-
fied with the statements. Yet no court has dismissed claims against such em-
ployees. 2 14 At the same time, section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 make no distinc-
tion between "insiders" and "outsiders" when discussing the extent of possi-
ble liability. Similarly, when an issuer commits fraud by essentially hiring
(or just allowing) someone else, such as a security analyst, to make the mis-
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
210. The Eighth Circuit in Charter Communications actually does not strictly
require that the defendant itself make the misrepresentation, since it is also sufficient
for liability if the defendant "affirmatively cause[s]" the fraudulent statement to be
made or even omitted. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc. (In re
Charter Communications, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 443 F.3d 987, 992 (2006), cert. granted,
75 U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-43). Neither the Eighth Circuit, nor
the Fifth Circuit, when following Charter Communications, elaborated on when a
defendant might affirmatively cause the fraudulent statement to be made.
211. The plaintiffs have emphasized this shortcoming in their briefs. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 06-1341, 2007 WL 1059567, at *20-21 (Apr. 5, 2007).
212. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition for Respondent Motorola, Inc., Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2006 WL 3024291, at *9 (U.S.
Oct. 20, 2006) (stating that "requirement to prove reliance precludes a Rule lob-5
claim against someone who did not make the statement in question").
213. The usual response is that plaintiffs reliance can take place through another
part of the fraudulent scheme - the issuer's misstatements. See Brief in Opposition,
Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys., No. 06-560, 2007 WL
432471, at *26 (U.S. Feb. 7, 2007) ("[R]equirement of reliance is satisfied if a mis-
representation was introduced into the securities market as a result of the fraudulent
scheme and defendant's conduct therein.").
214. See supra Part III.F for examples of recent cases. The courts follow different
theories in order to maintain such claims. See id.
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statements, 215 its liability is based on its engagement in the fraudulent
216
scheme, but not misrepresentation as such. Finally, the restrictive view
does not very well handle cases involving brokers who defraud their cli-
ents. 217 The principal way of holding the broker liable for securities fraud
under the restrictive view is by imposing on them a fiduciary duty to disclose,
but as indicated in a case above, such duties may not always exist.
21 8
The above criticism of the restrictive view applies to the approach of
those courts that reject scheme liability in cases where plaintiffs' claims are
essentially based on misrepresentations and omissions. 219 These courts argue
that by allowing any fraud case to be analyzed through the scheme liability
lens would allow plaintiffs to artfully plead misrepresentation cases as
scheme cases, avoiding many issues that Central Bank created for them.
However, each securities fraud claim should be assessed based on the ele-
ments of that particular claim; it is not sufficient to claim that the elements of
one claim are rejected, and therefore the second claim must necessarily fail as
well.
D. Scheme Liability Beyond Misrepresentation, Omission and Market
Manipulation
In the cases where courts reject the restrictive view of scheme liability,
the courts, including the Ninth Circuit, follow the policy of effective preven-
tion of securities fraud. The SEC clearly favors a broader approach to
scheme liability.
220
215. See supra Part III.G for examples of such cases.
216. In fact, the corporation does not make any misstatements at all in such a case
- its statements to the analysts are completely accurate. See Robert A. Prentice, Lo-
cating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REv. 691, 729 (1997) ("If a
'bright-line' rule that one entity can never be responsible for another's statements
were adopted, puppeteers who manipulate fraudulent schemes from behind the scenes
by pulling the strings and making others talk will go unpunished.").
217. See supra Part III.D for examples of such cases.
218. See supra note 120 and accompanying text for a decision where the court left
the existence of fiduciary duties open, but nevertheless imposed scheme liability on a
broker.
219. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
220. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Positions that Favor Appellant 16, Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., No.
04-55665 (9th Cir. 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/homestore_102104.pdf. The SEC continued to
support the broader theory after the Supreme Court decided to address the issue, but
the Solicitor General decided not to file an amicus brief, publicly siding with the
defendants. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Little Guy Has Little Recourse, NEWSWEEK, July
16, 2007, at 45.
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The problem with the broader view is that the courts have not proposed
a coherent and easily applicable test. The courts often go little beyond a
vague statement that there has to be some conduct beyond the misrepresenta-
tion by the defendant that is deceptive or fraudulent. 221 The most prominent
test so far, proposed by the SEC and thereafter adopted with minor modifica-
tions by the Ninth Circuit, makes a defendant liable if its conduct within a
scheme had the "principal purpose and effect" of fraud. 222
A reformulation of this test states that a defendant can be liable for
scheme liability when its "conduct itself is illegal, serves no business pur-
pose, or creates an impression of a material fact at odds with reality." 223 The
courts that have rejected the restrictive approach seem to reject scheme liabil-
ity when it makes "business sense" for the secondary actor (usually the fi-
nancer or "ordinary" business partner) to engage in practices that lead to se-
224
curities fraud. Such a test is, however, also broad and does not provide
useful guidance for solving scheme liability cases against all groups of defen-
dants discussed above.
For example, it is far from clear what constitutes a legitimate business
transaction in the case of investment banks and other financers. The legiti-
mate business purpose, economic substance, or sham transaction tests devel-
221. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 476 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (implying that the conduct has to be "in and of itself' fraudulent).
222. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006).
See also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, in Sup-
port of Positions that Favor Appellant, at 16, 18, Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc.,
No. 04-55665 (9th Cir. 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefsihomestore_102104.pdf (proposing the test and
arguing that a defendant should not be liable only if it "provides assistance to other
participants in a scheme but does not himself engage in a manipulative or deceptive
act"). The difference between the two tests is that Ninth Circuit requires that defen-
dant's own conduct has to be deceptive, not just the transaction in which it was in-
volved. See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1048.
223. Smith & Goldfarb, supra note 8; see also Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 8, at
3 (arguing that the Eighth Circuit is "plainly alarmed by the possibility that an ordi-
nary, arm's-length business transaction could leave the company that engaged in that
transaction liable").
224. See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1050 ("Conduct by the defendant that does not
have a principal legitimate business purpose, such as the invention of sham corporate
entities to misrepresent the flow of income, may have a principal purpose of creating
a false appearance."); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig.), 310 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (liability for "[s]ham busi-
ness transactions with no legitimate business purpose"). Despite adopting the restric-
tive view, the Eight Circuit stated in dicta that it did not want to impose liability in
case of "an arm's length business transaction in goods or services." Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc. (In re Charter Communications, Inc., Sec.
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oped under financial reporting 225 or tax 2 26 law rules are not very helpful in
resolving this question. Such tests are useful in determining whether the is-
suer has reported its financial position and accounted for tax liability in the
correct way. However, false reporting by the issuer is usually presumed in
Rule 1Ob-5 litigation against secondary actors, and thus it is almost always
the case that the issuer has allegedly violated some of the financial reporting
rules. The tests say nothing about whether the secondary actor, for example
by providing financing, has engaged in a transaction that has a fraudulent
primary purpose or is inherently fraudulent.
The first Enron decisions illustrate this ambiguity. Initially, the district
court considered the banks as having engaged in inherently deceptive transac-
tions when they provided in essence loans that were then accounted for as
revenue or equity contributions. 227  However, the court later changed its
mind, and for a good reason. The court explained that a bank can justify a
transaction as making business sense, even if the corporation accounted for it
in a "creative" way, so long as the bank receives a profit (usually, in the way
228
of interest). 8 In fact, the principal way for a bank to engage in a transaction
that does not make business sense is when it provides capital at a loss (or for
no profit) - something that is highly unlikely to happen in any case. In an
economic sense, there are no "sham" transactions from the bank's point of
view since a bank provides money with the hope of receiving it back, with
interest. Financing deals are often accounted for in complex ways, through
special purpose entities or other schemes, and they are rarely illegal for the
simple fact that they are complex. What seems fraudulent or a sham to the
third party is just a way of structuring the transaction for the bank in the most
risk-free way. 229 Setting up special purpose entities - the central part of the
Enron scheme - is the quintessential element of structured finance transac-
225. See generally, e.g., Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Fi-
nance, Financial Accounting and Tax Ownership, 25 J. CORP. L. 445 (2000) (provid-
ing an overview of financial accounting rules, including the economic substance doc-
trine, to synthetic leases).
226. See generally, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic
Substance, 52 TAx LAw. 235 (1999) (providing an overview of the economic sub-
stance doctrine).
227. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
"ERISA" Litig.), 310 F. Supp. 2d 819, 829-30 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (a bank engaged in an
actionable sham transaction when it "purchased" property that Enron promised to
repurchase with a higher price later).
228. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
"ERISA" Litig.), 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 721 (S.D. Tex. 2006) ("what remains when the
bluster is stripped away are financings and investments" (quoting In re Parmalat Sec.
Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))).
229. See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (stating that "a bank's use of special purpose corporate entities in connection
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tions. 23  Also, one cannot blame the banks for receiving benefits from the
transaction in unusual ways, e.g. in unrelated or even related consulting
fees. 2 3 1 The ways of earning profits from investments are varied, and some-
times providing capital at below cost for business development purposes is a
legitimate way of developing additional business.
The business purpose test is also not easily applied when advisers (law-
yers, investment banks and accountants in their consulting capacity) are in-
volved. Advice is "in itself' fraudulent probably only when it is false, i.e. the
advisor knows that the advice given is not very helpful but proceeds neverthe-
less. Securities class action plaintiffs do not usually claim that lawyers, ac-
countants, or investment banks somehow misled the defendants. The compa-
nies usually know quite well what they were doing when they followed the
advice they received. In an ordinary securities fraud case, advisers give ex-
actly the type of advice that the company has wished to receive. Thus, giving
advice serves a perfectly legitimate business purpose for the advisor - receiv-
ing fees for giving the advice. It is hard to imagine when such advice be-
comes inherently fraudulent against third parties.
To conclude, the "principal purpose and effect" and "inherently fraudu-
lent conduct" tests can be applicable in some circumstances (e.g. transactions
between ordinary business partners), but are not suited to solve other types of
cases. It simply does not provide an easily applicable test for assessing
whether scheme liability should be imposed in a particular case or not.
E. A Test for Scheme Liability?
Currently, the conflicting decisions in district and circuit courts have
amplified the uncertainty in the scheme liability field - no investment bank,
auditor, or attorney can be sure whether their advice in complex financial
transactions could be later used against them in securities litigation. Simi-
larly, business partners may not know whether their profitable (even though
unconventional) transaction might turn into a costly securities action. Surely,
a coherent and easily applicable test for analyzing scheme liability claims
would create more predictability. However, as the previous discussion has
230. See, e.g., Steven L. Scwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1539 (2004) (describing the issues with securitization transactions in the post-
Enron legal environment).
231. Such an argument was made in a case where KPMG, an accounting firm,
was involved in a transaction allowing the issuer, a software manufacturer, to misstate
its revenues. See Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees at *34, Bearingpoint, Inc.
& KPMG LLP, Loran Group v. Moores (In re Peregrine Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig.), No.
06-55197, 2006 WL 3522394 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2006). KPMG's role in the transac-
tion was to temporarily purchase software so that the manufacturer would be able to
report revenue from sales immediately, even though the sales to end users were not
completed. Id. In turn, KPMG's allegedly legitimate business purpose was to secure
lucrative service contracts connected to the same transactions. Id. at *35.
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shown, it is almost impossible to devise such a coherent test for all situations
and for all defendants. There might well be situations when the defendant
should not be held liable absent a misrepresentation or omission. There
might well be situations when the conduct itself can be fraudulent so that
imposing scheme liability is justified. However, it is not possible to create
one easily applicable test for all scheme liability claims.
The impossibility of such a test is an unavoidable consequence of the
wording of section 10(b): it prohibits the use of "any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance." 232 If Congress wanted clear rules with straight-
forward applications, it would surely amend such a broad and vague state-
ment. Instead, Congress decided to approach the problem of frivolous and
vexatious litigation in another way: by adopting the "Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995. "233 Instead of restricting fraud claims substan-
tively, the Act imposed heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs. 234 Plead-
ing standards allow defendants to dismiss frivolous claims much more easily
and in earlier stages of litigation, thus reducing the threat of vexatious litiga-
tion. The Act thus gives defendants some security that they are not hauled to
court for legitimate business transactions, while leaving the door open for
claims where fraud actually takes place.
The conclusion that one simple rule or test for assessing scheme liability
claims is impossible does not mean that clear standards are not needed for
particular types of cases. Therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt a uni-
form approach in order to remove the conflicting decisions applying the
"bright line," "substantial participation" and "creation of misrepresentation"
235tests. It should also resolve the conflict between the Fifth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits regarding the appropriate standard of scheme liability for busi-
ness partners, but restrict its ruling specifically to the types of defendants at
issue. 236 Appropriate tests for other types of cases should be devised when
those types of cases find more treatment before the appellate courts. 
237
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
233. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
234. See Kevin S. Shmelzer, Comment, The Door Slammed Shut Needs to Be
Reopened: Examining the Pleading Requirements Under the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 405 (2005) (summarizing the case law implement-
ing the new pleading requirements).
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part III.H. The Supreme Court properly framed the question be-
fore it narrowly, referring to applicability of scheme liability to business partners
only. See Questions Presented, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., No. 06-43 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/06-00043qp.pdf. It is well beyond the scope of
this law summary to suggest which test is most appropriate in that particular case.
237. As Part III of this summary shows, almost all cases on scheme liability so far
decided come from district courts.
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V. CONCLUSION
Recent cases that have analyzed securities fraud cases under Rule 1Ob-
5(a) and (c) have not yet converged around a unified approach. At the same
time, it is unlikely that litigation around Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c) will cease
soon.2 38 The recent options backdating scandals will likely stir up even more
litigation under the scheme liability provisions.2 39 As long as the extent of
scheme liability remains unsettled, the important policy goals of Central
Bank - to provide certainty and avoid vexatious litigation - remain only
partly fulfilled. Therefore, either legislative 240 or Supreme Court intervention
would provide much-needed clarity into securities litigation. However, the
adoption of an unnecessarily restrictive test for assessing scheme liability
claims could prevent meritorious claims against entities committing fraud to
proceed. Also, a broad test covering allegedly all cases of Rule 1Ob-5(a) and
(c) liability is inappropriate. The Supreme Court should, instead, provide
guidelines for assessing scheme liability claims by types of claims and defen-
dants one at a time.
TAAVI ANNuS
238. In fact, there are various actions pending in district courts where plaintiffs try
to rely on, and defendants try to reject, scheme liability. See, e.g., The UBS Defen-
dants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended
"Scheme" and Securities Act Theories, In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-
03-BE-1500-S, 2006 WL 2818165 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2006) (allegations of scheme
liability of investment banks for setting up complex investment instruments in a com-
pany that misled the public about the company's financial situation); Memorandum of
Law in Support of Oliver Peek's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Vacate the
Order of Preliminary Injunction, Freeze of Assets and Other Relief, SEC v. Lohmus
Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05 CV 9259, 2006 WL 2843181 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006)
(allegation that scheme liability is appropriate in a case involving an Estonian day
trader who employed a "spider program" to collect information from a business news
website before it was made officially public, and traded profitably in stock based on
this non-public information).
239. See Nichols & Warren, supra note 8, at 626; Complaint for Violation of
Federal Securities Laws, Vogel v. Jobs, No. C06-05208 MHP, 2006 WL 2703413
(N.D. Cal.,filed Aug. 14, 2006) (alleging scheme liability against Apple and its direc-
tors based on underreporting of company expenses due to options backdating).
240. Compare Taylor, supra note 26, at 386 ("Congress should expressly re-
establish aiding and abetting liability") with Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek Pro-
tection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2006, at 1 (describing efforts to legisla-
tively limit litigation possibilities under Rule 1 Ob-5).
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